141 research outputs found

    Cyber Security as an Emergent Infrastructure

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    Invited TalkWhen I began studying computer security in late 1972 as a Ph.D. student at Purdue University, the field was in its infancy. There were few academics working in the area, no research conferences or journals devoted to the field, and no professional societies to join. Security papers were presented at conferences and published in journals that covered more established areas of computer science, such as operating systems, or that treated computing and telecommunications broadly. The number of publications and Ph.D. theses relating to computer security was small enough that it was possible to read the entire literature. If there was any security industry at all, I was not aware of it

    On the Derivation of Lattice Structured Information Flow Policies

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    Key Escrow Encryption Policies and Technologies

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    Key Escrow Encryption Policies and Technologies

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    Government wiretapping, encryption and the clipper chip debate

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    Code wars: steganography, signals intelligence, and terrorism

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    This paper describes and discusses the process of secret communication known as steganography. The argument advanced here is that terrorists are unlikely to be employing digital steganography to facilitate secret intra-group communication as has been claimed. This is because terrorist use of digital steganography is both technically and operationally implausible. The position adopted in this paper is that terrorists are likely to employ low-tech steganography such as semagrams and null ciphers instead

    Distributed System Contract Monitoring

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    The use of behavioural contracts, to specify, regulate and verify systems, is particularly relevant to runtime monitoring of distributed systems. System distribution poses major challenges to contract monitoring, from monitoring-induced information leaks to computation load balancing, communication overheads and fault-tolerance. We present mDPi, a location-aware process calculus, for reasoning about monitoring of distributed systems. We define a family of Labelled Transition Systems for this calculus, which allow formal reasoning about different monitoring strategies at different levels of abstractions. We also illustrate the expressivity of the calculus by showing how contracts in a simple contract language can be synthesised into different mDPi monitors.Comment: In Proceedings FLACOS 2011, arXiv:1109.239

    A Spatial-Epistemic Logic for Reasoning about Security Protocols

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    Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information locality and knowledge propagation, usually they do not provide a general language for expressing arbitrary properties involving local knowledge and knowledge transfer. Building on this observation, we introduce a framework for security protocol analysis based on dynamic spatial logic specifications. Our computational model is a variant of existing pi-calculi, while specifications are expressed in a dynamic spatial logic extended with an epistemic operator. We present the syntax and semantics of the model and logic, and discuss the expressiveness of the approach, showing it complete for passive attackers. We also prove that generic Dolev-Yao attackers may be mechanically determined for any deterministic finite protocol, and discuss how this result may be used to reason about security properties of open systems. We also present a model-checking algorithm for our logic, which has been implemented as an extension to the SLMC system.Comment: In Proceedings SecCo 2010, arXiv:1102.516

    Model-driven Information Flow Security for Component-Based Systems

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    International audienceThis paper proposes a formal framework for studying information flow security in component-based systems. The security policy is defined and verified from the early steps of the system design. Two kinds of non-interference properties are formally introduced and for both of them, sufficient conditions that ensures and simplifies the automated verification are proposed. The verification is compositional, first locally, by checking the behavior of every atomic component and then globally, by checking the inter-components communication and coordination. The potential benefits are illustrated on a concrete case study about constructing secure heterogeneous distributed systems
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